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[1] The law in the federal courts governing whether litigants must disclose 
their backup tapes just changed.  Faced with the cost, burdens and 
uncertainties of mining backup tapes, as well as other sources of data that 
are difficult to reach, most litigants have simply been ignoring their 
backup tapes.  No more.  The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure adopt a new standard that embraces the Zubulake I distinction 
between “accessible” and “inaccessible” data,1 and requires the disclosing 
party to identify all its sources of data.2  While the new rules will often 
spare companies from having to produce inaccessible sources of data such 
as backup tapes used for disaster recovery purposes, companies must, in 
                                                 
* Mr. Esposito and Mr. Mueller are partners in the New York office of Morrison & 
Foerster LLP.  Both handle complex commercial cases for a variety of domestic and 
overseas clients.  As part of their trial practice, they counsel clients regarding the 
preparation for and handling of a variety of electronic-discovery issues.  The authors also 
wish to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance provided by Natalie Fleming, an 
associate in Morrison & Foerster’s litigation department. 
1 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I). 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
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the first instance, demonstrate why those data sources would be 
unreasonable to search because of undue burden or cost.3 
 
[2] Moreover, the amendments move the debate over electronically-stored 
information (“ESI”) to the beginning of the case.  Litigants must now 
disclose ESI as part of their initial disclosures and provide for discovery of 
ESI as part of their Rule 26(f) conferences.4  This shift to early assessment 
of ESI benefits producing parties.  Under past practices, some litigants 
opted to wait until the end of discovery to ask for e-mail.  The hope was 
that data that had not been specifically addressed, and thus preserved, had 
by this late stage in the case been overwritten, degaussed or discarded.  
And, as you would expect, that missing data, ignored throughout the case, 
suddenly became the most important piece of evidence and the subject of a 
sanctions motion.  Focusing the parties on ESI at the outset ends that 
tactic.  The benefits conferred by the end of e-discovery by ambush are not 
without a cost, however, as companies now need to make investments 
early in the litigation to be able to talk meaningfully about ESI.  As most 
companies do not know the location of all of their backup tapes, much less 
whether they are used solely for disaster recovery purposes or how much it 
would cost to process them for discovery, there remains much work to be 
done before the first Rule 26(f) conference under the new rules. 
 
[3] This article first describes the nature of backup tapes and their limited 
use in discovery, as well as the law governing a litigant’s obligation to 
preserve data contained on backup tapes.  This is followed by a discussion 
of the sampling approaches taken by various courts in deciding whether a 
litigant must search backup tapes, how to allocate the costs of conducting 
that search, and a litigant’s disclosure obligations with respect to data 
contained on backup media.  Finally, the article addresses what a company 
can do to escape from the crushing burden of an accumulation of outdated 
and generally useless backup tapes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Id. § (b)(2)(B) 
4 Id. § (a)(1)(B). 
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I. THE NATURE OF BACKUP TAPES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS IN DISCOVERY 
 
[4] Electronic data can be grouped into two broad categories: data which is 
reasonably accessible and data which is not.5  Generally speaking, in 
responding to discovery requests, a party is obligated to produce 
responsive, non-privileged accessible electronic data to the same extent 
as it is obligated to produce traditional paper data.6  Courts have been 
more willing to place limits on the obligation to produce inaccessible 
data, including shifting the costs of discovery of inaccessible data to the 
requesting party.7  And under the new Rule 26, “[a] party need not 
provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that 
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden 
or cost.”8 
 
[5] Data on backup tapes used for disaster recovery purposes is usually 
regarded as inaccessible, because such tapes function to quickly undo 
catastrophic systems failure, not as a filing cabinet.  In Rowe 
Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., the court recognized 
the difficulties created when litigants must comply with discovery requests 
seeking data contained on backup tapes: 
 
[E]ven if data is retained for limited purposes, it is not 
necessarily amenable to discovery.  Back-up tapes, for 
example, are not archives from which documents may 
easily be retrieved.  The data on a backup tape are not 
organized for retrieval of individual documents or files, but 
for wholesale, emergency uploading onto a computer 
system.  Therefore, the organization of the data mirrors the 
                                                 
5 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318.  Some courts have further divided these categories. For 
example, the court in Zubulake I identified five categories of data: active or online data; 
near-line data; archival data kept on removable media; data stored on backup tapes; and 
fragmented, erased or damaged data.  Id. at 318-20 (discussing in detail the categories of 
electronic data).  Under the Zubulake I taxonomy, documents in the first three categories 
are considered “accessible” data, while data falling into the last two categories is 
considered “inaccessible.”  Id. 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
7 See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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computer’s structure, not the human records management 
structure, if there is one.9 
 
[6] Moreover, “[t]he disadvantage of tape drives is that they are 
sequential-access devices, which means that to read any particular block 
of data, you need to read all the preceding blocks.”10 Consequently, “the 
data on a backup tape are not organized for retrieval of individual 
documents or files [because] … the organization of the data mirrors the 
computer’s structure, not the human records management structure.”11 
This means that retrieval of “a specific file or data set [from a backup tape 
is] a time-consuming and inefficient process.”12 Further, the data 
compression function of backup tapes—which saves storage space and 
reduces bandwidth by reducing the size of files—lacks uniform standards, 
thereby increasing the time and expense associated with restoration.13 
 
[7] Backup tapes also contain vast amounts of duplicative data.  Each time 
a full backup of a system is created, a copy of all of the data on that 
system is made without regard to whether other copies of that data 
already exist on backup tapes.14  Thus, if an organization makes a full 
backup of its e-mail systems once each week, and a particular e-mail 
remains in a user’s account for an entire year, at the end of that year the 
organization will have fifty-two sets of backup tapes each containing an 
identical copy of that e-mail. 
 
                                                 
9 Rowe Entm’t v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(citing Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation, SF97 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1079, 1085 (2001).  See, e.g., Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 
22439865, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003) (“[The Defendant’s] backup system is not an 
archiving system that would preserve all information going into[its] computers.  Rather, it 
is a disaster recovery system that takes only snapshots of  . . . computer files so that if a 
catastrophic event occurs, the information from the immediately preceding period can be 
reloaded.”). 
10 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319. 
11 Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).   
12 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® GLOSSARY FOR E-DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT  at *4 (May 2005), available at  
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/publications_html  
13 Id.  
14 See Craig Ball, A Practical Guide to E-mail Discovery, 41 TRIAL 29, 33 (2005).   
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[8] Finally, backup tapes often fail to capture relevant documents.  Backup 
tapes of e-mail are illustrative because they do not catch every message 
that flows through a user’s e-mail account.15 Rather, backup systems 
capture data that exists at the time the backup is created.  Accordingly, 
backup tapes will only contain those e-mails that exist in the users’ e-mail 
accounts at the particular moment at which the backups are created.16  If a 
user receives and immediately moves an e-mail to a Personal Store 
(“PST”) file that is not backed up, then the likelihood is that no copy of 
that e-mail will be included on the backup tape.17  By contrast, that user’s 
PST files could still contain a copy of the relevant e-mails.18 
 
[9] In sum, while backup tapes provide a valuable tool to organizations in 
guarding against catastrophic failure of computer systems, their very 
nature presents unique challenges to parties seeking to use them as a 
source of data in discovery.  But the federal discovery rules are liberally 
applied.  Consequently, litigants must be prepared to receive and address 
requests for information housed on backup tapes, a subject to which we 
now turn. 
 
II. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE BACKUP TAPES 
 
A. COMMON LAW PRESERVATION OBLIGATION 
 
[10] Numerous courts have made clear that a party has an “obligation to 
preserve evidence [that] arises when the party has notice that the evidence 
is relevant to litigation or when a party should have known that the 
evidence may be relevant to future litigation.”19  As discussed below, 
                                                 
15 See Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005); Ball, supra note 14, at 33–34.  
16 See Quinby, 2005 WL 3453908, at *7. 
17 See Consol. Aluminum Corp., v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 03-1055-C-M2, 2006 WL 2583308, 
at *3, *6 (M.D. La. July 19, 2006). 
18 See id. 
19 Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).  See also Silvestri 
v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The duty to preserve 
material evidence arises not only during litigation but also extends to that period before 
the litigation when a party reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to 
anticipated litigation.”); Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) 
Th[e] obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice 
that the evidence is relevant to litigation—most commonly when suit 
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while the common law preservation obligation applies to electronic 
information as well as to paper documents, the parameters of its 
application to backup tapes have not yet been fully defined. 
 
B. APPLICATION OF PRESERVATION DUTY TO BACKUP TAPES 
 
[11] Prior to the Zubulake family of cases, the most comprehensive court 
rulings addressing the issue of backup tapes came out of the Eastern 
District of Arkansas in a series of decisions related to the case of Concord 
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. (Concord I).20  Concord I involved, inter 
alia, requests for e-mail stored on “several hundred” backup tapes.21  At 
the outset, the court recognized that the defendant’s backup tape system 
was used “primarily for disaster prevention rather than archival” 
purposes.22  Thus, it was questionable whether the backup tapes at issue 
“would contain significant information not already discovered.”23  But the 
court also recognized that, given the large number of backup tapes, it was 
possible that additional discoverable information was contained on the 
tapes.24  The problem was that “there [was] no way of knowing what 
remain[ed] hidden without actually conducting a more complete search.”25   
 
[12] Ultimately, relying on the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered the defendant to search 
its active e-mail system for responsive material, but declined to order the 
restoration of e-mail backup tapes.26  In reaching this decision, the court 
found that any limited gains achieved by restoring the backup tapes would 
be outweighed by the substantial burden and expense associated with 
                                                                                                                         
has already been filed, providing the party responsible for the 
destruction with express notice, but also on occasion in other 
circumstances, as for example when a party should have known that the 
evidence may be relevant to future litigation. 
20 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C_95-781, 1996 WL 33347247 (E.D. 
Ark. Dec. 23, 1996). 
21 See id. at *1–2.    
22 Id. at *2. 
23 Id.   
24 See id. at *2–3  
25 Id. at *2. 
26 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, 
at *9 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (Concord II).   
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conducting the search.27  In particular, the court observed that because 
backup tapes were recycled every two weeks, the only definite 
information that would result from restoration would be information that 
was fourteen days older than that contained on the active system.28  In the 
court’s estimation, the fact that there might be “a few deleted e-mail” in 
the fourteen days worth of e-mail was not enough to justify the expense 
necessary to obtain it.29   
 
[13] The general acceptance of the approach outlined in Concord II has 
since given way to the more recent analysis of the duty to preserve 
information contained on backup tapes found in Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV).30 In that case, the court addressed a situation 
where a litigant produced some, but not all, backup tapes containing data 
for certain key employees.31  The plaintiff sought sanctions for 
defendant’s failure to preserve the missing backup tapes.32  Specifically 
addressing the scope of the general duty to preserve information contained 
on backup tapes, the court explained: 
 
Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of 
litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or 
electronic document, and every backup tape? The answer is 
clearly, “no”.  Such a rule would cripple large corporations 
. . . that are almost always involved in litigation.  As a 
general rule, then, a party need not preserve all backup 
tapes even when it reasonably anticipates litigation.33 
 
[14] Zubulake IV does not, however, establish a bright-line rule that 
exempts backup tapes from the duty to preserve.34   Instead, the court 
                                                 
27 Id.  
28 Id.    
29 Id. 
30 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV) .    
31 Id. at 218.   
32 Id. at 219.   
33 Id. at 217 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
34 The amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, “[a]bsent exceptional 
circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under [the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure] on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a 
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37(f). 
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inquired into how the backup system in question operated in order to 
determine whether a specific tape must be preserved in certain 
circumstances: 
 
As a general rule, [a] litigation hold does not apply to 
inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those typically maintained 
solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which may 
continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the 
company’s policy.  On the other hand, if backup tapes are 
accessible (i.e., actively used for information retrieval), 
then such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation 
hold.   
 
However, it does make sense to create one exception to 
this general rule.  If a company can identify where 
particular employee documents are stored on backup 
tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of “key 
players” to the existing or threatened litigation should be 
preserved if the information contained on those tapes is 
not otherwise available.  This exception applies to all 
backup tapes.35 
 
[15] It is important to note, however, that in Zubulake IV, the producing 
party, UBS Warburg LLC (“UBS”), was an entity regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and was therefore subject to 
the detailed recordkeeping provisions of SEC Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4.36  
                                                 
35 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (emphasis added). In addition, the Zubulake court 
indicated in a footnote that litigants are now on notice that “backup tapes that can be 
identified as storing information created by or for ‘key players’ must be preserved.”  Id. 
at 220, n.47.  
36For classification of Zubulake as a party, see Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 
F.R.D. 309, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I) . The court explained that Rule 17a-3 
establishes the records that must be created and maintained by broker-dealers, and Rule 
17a-4 addresses the record retention periods and the accessibility requirements.  In 
particular, Rule 17a-4 provides, in pertinent part, “[e]very [ ] broker and dealer shall 
preserve for a period of not less than 3 years, the first two years in an accessible place . . . 
originals of all communications received and copies of all communications sent by such 
member, broker or dealer (including inter-office memoranda and communications) 
relating to his business as such.” Id. at 314, n.21 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(b) and 
(4)) (alterations in original). 
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Accordingly, UBS “implemented extensive e[-]mail backup and 
preservation protocols” and backed up e-mail on both backup tapes and 
optical disks.37  To satisfy regulatory requirements, UBS implemented a 
“backup” system designed to store and retrieve e-mail for regulators, as 
opposed to employing a backup system designed solely for disaster 
recovery purposes.38  Further, the backup tape program used by UBS, 
Veritas NetBackup, created an index of each backup tape, allowing UBS 
to search through the tapes from the relevant time period prior to 
restoration and to identify the e-mail files responsive to the plaintiff’s 
request.39 By utilizing the indexing feature of its backup tape system, UBS 
was able to narrow the field of potentially relevant backup tapes to ninety-
four in the first instance.40   
 
[16] Thus, with respect to backup tapes, the Zubulake opinions carry 
several important lessons. First, to the extent a company actively uses its 
backup tapes for information retrieval, it may have an obligation to retain 
those tapes in connection with litigation.  Judge Schiendlin did not 
indicate whether the occasional use of backup tapes to recover information 
accidentally deleted by employees renders them “accessible,” and 
therefore subject to a litigation hold.  Research has revealed no subsequent 
authority on this issue.  On the other hand, where backup tapes serve the 
traditional purpose of disaster recovery, they should be deemed 
“inaccessible.”41 
 
[17] Second, even where backup tapes serve solely as a means of disaster 
recovery, the obligation to retain those backup tapes may arise if a 
company can identify data pertaining to key players that is only available 
on backup tapes.  But, keep in mind that Zubulake I involved a backup 
                                                 
37 Id. at 314. The optical disks used by UBS to backup its e-mail system were not 
erasable or rewriteable and saved every e-mail sent to or received by UBS’s registered 
traders from outside sources.  Id. at 315. These optical disks were also easily searchable 
using a program called Tumbleweed.  Id.  Internal e-mail, however, were not stored on 
optical disks.  Id. 
38 See id. at 314. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  See also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(Zubulake III) (clarifying that UBS later found that only 77 of the backup tapes contained 
relevant material). 
41 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV) . 
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tape system that allowed the defendant to narrow the field of potentially 
relevant backup tapes relatively easily.42  It remains to be seen whether the 
preservation obligations articulated in Zubulake IV will apply equally to a 
situation in which narrowing the field of potentially relevant backup tapes 
is time consuming and expensive.  Research to date has yielded no 
subsequent decisions addressing that question. 
 
III. THE OBLIGATION AND COSTS OF PRODUCING DATA CONTAINED ON 
BACKUP TAPES 
 
[18] Recognizing the massive expense that can accompany the restoration 
and searching of data contained on backup tapes, the federal courts have 
tried to fashion reasonable compromises in resolving discovery disputes.  
The recent trend is to require a litigant to restore a sample set of the 
backup tapes at issue and to search those tapes for responsive material in 
order to assess the type of data contained on the backup tapes and the 
total costs of restoration.43  Then, the court will consider shifting to the 
requesting party some of the costs incurred in making “inaccessible” data 
“accessible” for discovery purposes.44 
 
A. EMPLOYING SAMPLING TECHNIQUES TO EVALUATE BACKUP DATA 
 
[19] In an effort to evaluate adequately the quality of the data contained on 
backup tapes, as well as the potential costs associated with restoring them, 
courts have increasingly utilized the sampling method.  This sampling 
approach is a qualitative process; it does not aspire to reach confidence 
intervals associated with quantitative concepts, such as statistical 
significance. Instead, sampling involves an analysis of a small subset of 
tapes using a limited number of search terms, and extrapolates the results 
to determine the value of processing additional tapes.45  
                                                 
42 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 315 (describing the program “Tumbleweed, “ the backup 
tape system used by UBS Warburg. 
43 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (McPeek I) . 
44 Id. at 34-35. 
45 See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 601-03 
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (fashioning a protocol based on the Zubulake I and McPeek sampling 
methods that required the defendant to search any five backup tapes that the plaintiff 
selected); Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311-12 (ordering defendant UBS to restore and 
produce, at its own expense, responsive e-mail from any five backup tapes selected by the 
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[20] This “sampling” is generally accomplished by restoring a subsection 
of the backup tapes at issue and then searching that subset of tapes for 
potentially relevant documents using key words.46  The seminal sampling 
case is McPeek v. Ashcroft.47 In McPeek, an employee for the Bureau of 
Prisons sued the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), claiming that he had been 
retaliated against for accusing a supervisor of sexual harassment.48  The 
employee requested restoration of the DOJ’s backup tapes in order to 
search for evidence of retaliatory e-mail.49  The DOJ argued that because 
there was such a remote possibility that any search of the e-mail backup 
system would yield relevant evidence, there was no justification for the 
costs involved in the restoration.50 
 
[21] The McPeek court first determined that there was no authority for the 
proposition that a party is required to restore all backup tapes in every 
case.51  Further, the court found that “making the producing party pay for 
all costs of restoration as a cost of its ‘choice’ to use computers create[d] a 
disincentive for the requesting party to demand anything less than all of 
the tapes.” 52  Nonetheless, the court also recognized that it would be 
inappropriate to make the party seeking the restoration of backup tapes 
pay the entire costs of doing so.53  As a compromise, the court adopted the 
“marginal utility” approach.54 This approach is based on the economic 
principle that “[t]he more likely it is that the backup tape contains 
                                                                                                                         
plaintiff); Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04Civ. 7406 (WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 15, 2005) (discussing court’s requirement that defendant restore “as a 
sample” backup tape(s) from the relevant period). 
46 See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(employing “key word” search of backup tapes); Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324. . 
47 McPeek I, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).   
48 Id. at 32. 
49 Id.    
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 33. 
52 Id. The McPeek court also suggested that litigants who are “consistently required to 
pay for the restoration of backup tapes . . .  may be sorely tempted not to have such 
systems.”  Id. at 34. While recognizing that the notion that businesses would not employ 
backup systems if they were forced to restore them in every litigation might seem 
“fanciful,” the court nonetheless noted that “courts should not lead [businesses] into 
temptation.” Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.   
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information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the 
[responding party] search at its own expense.”55  
 
[22] The court then ordered that a “test run” should be performed.56  The 
DOJ was directed to restore, at its own cost, backup tapes containing e-
mail attributable to the supervisor’s computer for a one-year period, 
during which part of the retaliation had allegedly taken place.57   
Following restoration, the court reviewed the results of the initial search, 
determined that it was unlikely that the backup tapes contained 
information pertinent to the case, and refused to find that the mere 
possibility that data existed was sufficient to justify wholesale additional 
searches at what would certainly be a prohibitive cost.58 
 
[23] In Zubulake I, Judge Shira Scheindlin endorsed a sampling approach 
similar to that followed in McPeek.59 The plaintiff in this case sought 
restoration of e-mail contained on UBS’s backup tapes.60  Because its 
backup system automatically created an index of the backup tapes, UBS 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 34. 
58 See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2003) (McPeek II). The McPeek 
decision did not provide any factual background regarding the total number of backup 
tapes at issue or the costs associated with restoring and reviewing those tapes.  Rather, 
the court summarily noted that the defendant estimated that it would cost no less than $93 
per hour for eight hours to restore a single backup tape.  See McPeek I, 202 F.R.D. at 32. 
The court in McPeek I, however, did include in its opinion a general statement regarding 
comparative costs of restoration versus the likelihood of discovering relevant data: 
If the likelihood of finding something was the only criterion, there is a 
risk that someone will have to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars 
to produce a single e-mail. That is an awfully expensive needle to 
justify searching a haystack. It must be recalled that ordering the 
producing party to restore backup tapes upon a showing of likelihood 
that they will contain relevant information in every case gives the 
plaintiff a gigantic club with which to beat his opponent into 
settlement. No corporate president in her right mind would fail to settle 
a lawsuit for $100,000 if the restoration of backup tapes would cost 
$300,000. While that scenario might warm the cockles of certain 
lawyers’ hearts, no one would accuse it of being just.   
Id. at 34. 
59 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(Zubulake I) . 
60 Id. at 311-12. 
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succeeded in eventually narrowing the universe of potentially relevant 
backup tapes to ninety-four tapes.61  UBS estimated that it would cost 
$175,000 to restore and search the backup tapes.62 An actual sample, the 
court observed, would provide tangible evidence of what the backup 
tapes contained and the time and cost required to restore them.63  
Therefore, the Zubulake I court ordered UBS to restore and produce, at 
its own expense, responsive e-mail from any five backup tapes selected 
by the plaintiff.64   
 
[24] The sampling ultimately cost UBS $11,524.63, or $2,304.93 per 
tape.65  The court extrapolated that the total cost of restoring the remaining 
seventy-two tapes was $165,954.67. 66 After reviewing the results of the 
sampling, the court concluded that hundreds of new, relevant e-mails had 
been discovered.67  As a result, the court ordered the plaintiff to bear only 
25% of the costs of restoring the remaining backup tapes.68   
 
[25] Next, in Hagemeyer North America, Inc. v. Gateway Data Science 
Corporation, a Wisconsin federal court followed Zubulake I and McPeek 
in adopting the sampling method as a tool to aid its cost-shifting 
analysis.69  Hagemeyer involved an unspecified number of backup tapes 
that the plaintiff had discovered as a result of its search of boxes 
contained in the defendant’s warehouse.70  The plaintiff copied and 
reviewed a number of these backup tapes but found no e-mail.71   
Nevertheless, the plaintiff contended that e-mail was contained on the 
                                                 
61 Id. at 314. The Zubulake decisions do not provide sufficient information to ascertain 
what the total volume of backup tapes would have been without this indexing capability. 
62 Id. at 312. 
63 Id. at 324. 
64 Id. (“Requiring the responding party to restore and produce responsive documents 
from a small sample of the requested backup tapes is a sensible approach in most 
cases.”). 
65 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(Zubulake III). 
66 Id. at 283. 
67 Id. at 286-87. 
68 Id. at 291. 
69 Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc., v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602-03 
(E.D.Wis. 2004). 
70 Id. at 603. 
71 Id. at 597. 
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remaining backup tapes based largely on statements made by one of the 
defendant’s top executives that the company’s backup tapes generally 
contained e-mail, among other items, and on the plaintiff’s recovery of a 
handful of e-mail from diskettes discovered in the warehouse.72 The 
plaintiff then moved to compel the defendant to search the backup tapes, 
at defendant’s own cost, for e-mail containing certain keywords.73   
 
[26] While it did not discuss the specific costs associated with restoring 
the backup tapes at issue, the Hagemeyer court observed that the cost of 
restoring and reviewing backup tapes could be hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.74  Recognizing the potential for placing an undue burden on the 
responding party, the court crafted a protocol based on the Zubulake I 
and McPeek sampling methods.75  Under that protocol, the defendant 
was required to search any five backup tapes that the plaintiff selected, 
after which the parties were to submit briefing on whether that search 
yielded productive results so that the utility of further searching could be 
determined.76  The court would then determine whether the costs of 
producing data contained on the defendant’s backup tapes should be 
shifted to the plaintiff.77 
 
[27] Sampling methods have also resulted in situations where the 
requesting party must bear the majority of the costs of production.  In 
Wiginton,78 the defendant gathered ninety-four backup tapes gathered 
from its eleven offices.79  The plaintiff hired an outside electronic-
discovery vendor to restore one monthly backup tape from each of three 
different offices and to search the backup tapes using ninety-eight 
different terms.80 In addition, the court instructed each party to select four 
                                                 
72 Id. at 597-98. 
73 Id. at 597. 
74 Id. at 601. 
75 Id. at 603. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
79 Id. at 570. 
80 Id. Although in Wiginton the requesting party bore the costs of sampling, most courts 
require the producing party to shoulder the initial costs of restoration for purposes of 
conducting a sampling of backup tapes at issue.  See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I) ; McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 
F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (McPeek I). 
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terms, which the vendor would use to search the tapes for responsive 
documents.81   Following this sampling, the vendor provided the parties 
with an estimate of the costs of processing the ninety-four tapes.82  As a 
result of the large number of documents identified by the sampling, the 
vendor revised its original estimate of $46,000-$61,000 to $183,500-
$249,900 for the project.83 The Wiginton court concluded that defendants 
should bear 25% and plaintiffs 75% of the discovery costs associated with 
restoring the tapes, searching the data, and transferring it to an electronic 
viewer.84  The court further ordered that each party bear its own costs in 
reviewing the data and for any printing.85 
 
[28] In light of the foregoing cases, a growing trend in favor of sampling 
becomes apparent.86  When faced with requests for the restoration and 
searching of a large volume of backup tapes, courts instruct the litigants 
(and their experts) to analyze a subset of those tapes using a limited 
number of search terms, and then extrapolate the quality of the results to 
determine whether further restoration and searching of backup tapes is 
justified.87  Just as litigants could not expect every shred of paper an 
adversary possessed, so too must parties realize that they will not extract 
every megabyte of data.88  With the outcome of the sampling techniques 
                                                 
81 Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 570. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 570, 575. 
84 Id. at 577. 
85 Id. In addition to the sampling methods employed by the courts, some commentators 
have offered further principles to guide sampling approaches.  See Ashish S. Prasad and 
William H.J. Hubbard, Just a Peek: Sampling of Backup Tapes, FOR THE DEFENSE, June 
2004, at 37-40 (arguing that sampling can provide defendants with a strategy for reducing 
costs and burden in cases, advising that defendants and their counsel should have a 
comprehensive plan that accounts for both sample size (e.g., absolute number of tapes or 
by category) and sampling method (e.g., allowing plaintiffs to select the sample, having 
the court make a random selection, or proposing a systematic, non-random sampling), 
and should be prepared to assist the court in interpreting the results of any sampling). 
86 See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 81 P.3d 659, 661-62 (Okla. 2003) (explicitly 
endorsing sampling in the course of discovery of large amounts of paper and electronic 
data).   
87 See, e.g., Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 568. 
88See Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus. Inc., No. Civ.A. 01CV10287RCL, 2002 
WL 32309413, *5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (refusing to order a search of backup tapes, 
even at requester’s expense, when the responding party “has already conducted an 
extensive search for relevant documents.  At some point the adversary system needs to 
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known, federal courts turn to the next step in guarding against the 
potential abuse of discovery that can result by requiring expensive and 
time-consuming restoration of backup tapes: allocating costs. 
 
B. EMPLOYING A COST-SHIFTING ANALYSIS 
 
[29] In the federal courts, “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed that ‘the 
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of 
complying with discovery requests.”’89  As noted, however, the expense of 
complying with a discovery request to produce data contained on backup 
tapes can be immense.90  Recognizing this potential undue burden, some 
federal courts have elected to employ a cost-shifting analysis, derived 
from Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to evaluate which 
party should bear the costs associated with electronic discovery.  Again, 
the most widely-followed approach in this area comes from the Southern 
District of New York. 
 
1. COST-SHIFTING PRE-ZUBULAKE: ROWE 
 
[30] In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., the 
Southern District of New York first articulated some clear guidelines for 
analyzing whether cost-shifting was appropriate in circumstances where 
the production of electronic media involved significant burden and 
expense.91  Those guidelines required a consideration of eight factors, 
including, inter alia, the likelihood of discovering critical information, the 
purposes for which the producing party maintained the requested data, the 
relative ability of each party to control costs, and the total costs associated 
with production. 92 
                                                                                                                         
say ‘enough is enough’ and recognize that the costs of seeking every relevant piece of 
discovery is not reasonable.”).    
89Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake 1) 
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358,(1978)).    
90 See, e.g., Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 568; Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 309; Oppenheimer, 
437 U.S. at 340. 
91 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429-33 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002).   
92 Id. at 429 (employing the following eight factors: (1) the specificity of the discovery 
requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such 
information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the responding party 
maintains the requested data; (5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the 
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[31] Applying those factors, the Rowe court determined that (a) the 
breadth of plaintiff’s request, (b) the low probability that the tapes 
contained significant amounts of relevant data, (c) the fact that the backup 
tapes were not accessed by the defendants in the regular course of 
business, (d) the plaintiff’s ability to control costs, and (e) the magnitude 
of the costs of restoration (estimated between $148,000 and $221,000), all 
militated in favor of cost-shifting.93  Thus, the court ordered that the 
expense of restoring and searching the data on the backup tapes should be 
borne fully by the requesting party.94   
 
2. THE ZUBULAKE SEVEN FACTOR COST-SHIFTING ANALYSIS 
 
[32] One year later, Judge Scheindlin modified the Rowe eight-factor 
test.95 In Zubulake I, Judge Scheindlin criticized the Rowe approach for 
not properly taking into account the proportionality test of Rule 26 and the 
presumption that the producing party should bear the costs of 
production.96  The decision cautioned that cost-shifting should be 
considered only when electronic discovery imposes an “undue burden or 
expense” on the producing party.97  The court explained that 
 
[t]he burden or expense of discovery is, in turn, “undue” 
when it “outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account 
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery 
in resolving the issues.”98   
 
[33] The Zubulake I court also drew a distinction between “accessible” 
and “inaccessible” electronic media.99 The court found that relevant 
                                                                                                                         
information; (6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the relative ability of each 
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available to each 
party). 
93 Id. at 429-32. 
94 Id. at 432-33. 
95 See Zubulake v. Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I).  
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 318. 
98 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(iii)). 
99 Id. at 318-20. 
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electronic information stored in an “accessible” format must be produced 
at the producing party’s expense.100 But where a party seeks the 
production of material from “inaccessible” media, like backup tapes, the 
court determined that a cost-shifting analysis would be appropriate.101  
The court then set forth its seven-factor test: 
 
(1) The extent to which the request is specifically 
tailored to discover relevant information; 
(2) The availability of such information from other 
sources; 
(3) The total cost of production, compared to the 
amount in controversy; 
(4) The total cost of production, compared to the 
resources available to each party; 
(5) The relative ability of each party to control costs 
and its incentive to do so; 
(6) The importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation; and 
(7) The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining this 
information.102 
 
[34] In advocating its analysis, the court noted that the test should not be 
applied “mechanically,” but should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
taking into consideration all of the pertinent facts.103  Further, the court 
suggested that weighing the seven factors in descending order of 
importance should avoid any mechanistic application of the test.104 
                                                 
100 Id. at 324. 
101 See id. at 318. In distinguishing between “accessible” and “inaccessible” data, the 
Zubulake I court found that active, near-line and archival data should be considered 
“accessible,” whereas backup media designed for disaster recovery and fragmented, 
erased or damaged data should be considered “inaccessible.”  Id. at 318-20. 
102 Id. at 322. 
103 Id. at 323. 
104 Id. Parties resisting requests for production may still object that the requests are not 
narrowly tailored to seek relevant electronic materials.  See Custodian of Records v. 
Wisconsin, 680 N.W.2d 792, 807 (Wis. 2004) (quashing subpoena that requested backup 
tapes from fifty-four government servers as overbroad, because it compelled production 
of computer data from an entire branch of government rather than requesting specific 
topics, document types, or time periods). 
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[35] Ultimately, the Zubulake court ruled that the plaintiff should share in 
the costs of restoration, but found that defendant would be required to bear 
75% of those costs.105  In addition, in Zubulake III, the producing party 
was required to bear all the costs of review once the documents were 
restored from an “inaccessible” format to an “accessible” format.106  The 
courts addressing the production of documents from backup tapes since 
the Zubulake decisions have adopted that court’s cost-shifting analysis.107   
 
[36] In sum, sampling is an accepted method for evaluating the costs 
associated with restoring backup tapes and the quality of the data 
contained thereon.  The ultimate determination as to which party should 
bear the costs of producing material contained on backup tapes depends 
upon the court’s analysis of all of the cost-shifting factors.  Where a search 
of backup tapes is likely to return large amounts of responsive data not 
available from other sources, however, the producing party should expect 
to bear the bulk of the costs.108 
                                                 
105 Zubulake v. Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III).  It 
should be noted that UBS estimated the cost of restoring the backup tapes at issue to be 
only $175,000.  Other courts addressing more significant restoration costs have also 
ordered cost-shifting.  See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA. Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 
99-3564, 2002 WL 246439 at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (adopting the Rowe factors in a 
pre-Zubulake I case, the court considered cost-shifting where the estimated total costs for 
restoring and producing e-mail from backup tapes was $6.2 million, and ordered that, for 
one of the backup tapes, the requesting party would pay restoration costs and the 
producing party would pay for the review of the data restored, and then the court would 
consider the results and any additional action in a later court conference).  See also 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I) 
(noting that UBS estimated the cost of restoring the backup tapes at issue to be only 
$175,000).   
106 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 291. 
107 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572-77 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(adopting Zubulake I’s seven factor test, plus adding a factor for consideration of the 
importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues in the litigation, and 
ultimately deciding to shift 75% of the costs to the requesting party).  See also 
Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 599-603 (E.D. 
Wis. 2004) (canvassing all of the different tests developed by the courts for evaluating 
the production of backup tapes and determining that the Zubulake I seven-factor test best 
integrated the principles of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)). 
108 Other courts have entertained cost-shifting in the context of backup tapes without 
employing a sampling methodology.  For example, in Byers, the court adopted the 
McPeek I marginal utility analysis, but did not employ any sampling techniques.  See 
Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 3. 2002) 
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IV. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF BACKUP TAPES 
 
[37] In light of the current limitations on the duty to produce and preserve 
data contained on backup tapes, the question arises as to whether a party is 
required to voluntarily disclose the existence of backup tapes that might 
contain data relevant to a particular litigation.  Whereas the answer to this 
question had been unclear under the old Rule 26 and the cases 
interpreting it, the answer today is yes. 
 
[38] The amendments to the Federal Rules seek to facilitate the early 
disclosure of electronically-stored information, including sources of 
electronic information deemed “inaccessible” like backup tapes, in order 
to promote the resolution of any discovery disputes through negotiation, 
rather than court intervention.109  Specifically, the amendments to Rules 
26(a), 26(b)(2) and 26(f) direct the parties to disclose and discuss the 
production of electronically-stored information, including inaccessible 
electronic information, during the early stages of litigation.110   
                                                                                                                         
(determining that a search of the backup tapes was unlikely to result in the discovery of 
relevant e-mail and that the estimated cost of conducting the search was $20,000 to 
$30,000).  Id. at *11.  The court held that the plaintiffs would be entitled to the e-mail 
contained on backup tapes only if the plaintiffs were willing to pay for part of the costs of 
production.  Id. at *12.  In another case, the Western District of Tennessee adopted the 
Rowe eight-factor cost-shifting analysis and the McPeek I marginal-utility approach, but 
did not employ sampling to inform its decision.  See Medtronic Sofamore Danek, Inc. v. 
Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).  After conducting its factual 
analysis, the court ordered that all fiscal year-end backup tapes from the time period at 
issue (1997-2002), plus all backup tapes from the thirty days preceding the date of the 
order, would be restored.  Id. at 560.  The costs of such restoration, estimated at $4,881 
per tape, was to be shared between the parties: 60% by the plaintiff (the producing party) 
and 40% by the defendant (the requesting party).  Id. at 561.  The total number of tapes 
that would actually be restored was not disclosed, but the total universe of backup tapes 
at issue was 996.  Id. at 558.  It should be noted that the court acknowledged that the 
“several million” dollars estimated to restore all 996 tapes amounted to less than 2% of 
the amount at issue in the suit, but nonetheless recognized that the cost of restoration was 
substantial.  Id. 
109 See Excerpt from the Report on the Civ. Rules Advisory Comm. (July 25, 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Excerpt_CV_Report.pdf [hereinafter Advisory 
Committee Report]. 
110 In addition to the amendments to the Federal Rules, a number of federal district courts 
have adopted local rules or standing orders to address a party’s discovery obligations 
with respect to electronic materials.  See, e.g., D. Kan. Elec. Discovery Guidelines, 
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/guidelines/electronicdiscoveryguidelines.pdf (last visited 
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[39] Rule 26(a) was amended to “clarif[y] a party’s duty to include in its 
initial disclosures electronically stored information by substituting 
‘electronically stored information’ for ‘data compilations.’”111 It should be 
noted, however, that the disclosure of “electronically stored information” 
is still limited to information the disclosing party may use to support its 
case.112 
 
[40] The amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) provides that a party is not required 
to produce electronically-stored information that is not accessible because 
of undue burden or cost.113 But a responding party is required to identify 
the sources of potentially responsive information that it will not search or 
produce due to the costs and burdens of accessing the information.114  This 
amendment is intended to improve upon the present practice, under which, 
according to the Judicial Conference “responding parties simply do not 
produce electronically stored information that is difficult to access.”115  If 
                                                                                                                         
March 19, 2007) (requiring discussion of electronic discovery at Rule 26(f) conference); 
D. N.J. Civ. R. 26.1(d)(1) (same); D. Wyo. R. 26.1(e) (same); E.D. Ark. Local R. 26.1 
(same); W.D. Ark. Local R. 26.1 (same); Default Standard for Discovery of Elec. Docs, 
promulgated by the Ad Hoc Comm. for Electronic Discovery of the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Delaware, www.ded.uscourts.gov/Announce/AdHoc-Disc.pdf  
[hereinafter D. Del. Discovery of Elec. Documents] (same); 9th Cir. Local Rule 
(proposing the preservation of potentially responsive electronic data in accordance with 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34); M.D. Fla. Local R. 3.03(f) (requiring counsel to use technology to the 
maximum extent possible during all phases of litigation). For example, some federal 
district courts have mandated that parties or their counsel identify potential sources of 
electronic information as well as individuals with knowledge of a party’s electronic 
systems in advance of a Rule 26(f) conference.  See, e.g., D. Del. Discovery of Elec. 
Documents (requiring parties to disclose a list of their electronic systems, including 
which electronic documents are of “limited accessibility,” prior to the Rule 26(f) 
conference and mandating the designation of an “E-discovery liaison”); D. N.J. Civ. R. 
26.1(d)(1) (stating that “[t]o determine what must be disclosed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(1), counsel shall further review with the client the client’s information files, 
including currently maintained computer files as well as historical, archival, back-up, and 
legacy computer files...”). See Excerpt from the Report of the Judicial Conf. Comm. on 
Rules of Prac. and Proc. at 7-13 (Sept. 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Excerpt_STReport_CV.pdf [hereinafter Report 
of the Judicial Conference] (last visited March 19, 2006).    
111 Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 110, at 7.  
112 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 109, at 15.  
113 See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 110, at 11.   
114 See id. at 12.   
115 Id. 
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the requesting party seeks discovery of such sources, the responding party 
then has the burden to show that they are not reasonably accessible.116  
Even where this showing is made, however, the court may nonetheless 
order discovery if—after considering the limitations set forth in Rule 
26(b)(2) relating to the burdens and expense of production—the 
requesting party shows good cause.117  The goal is to encourage the 
resolution of disputes regarding electronic discovery issues through early 
disclosure and negotiation between the parties, without the need to resort 
to court intervention.118  Where negotiations fail, the amendment to Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) expressly incorporates a method for judicial resolution.119 
 
V. WHAT TO DO WITH YOUR OUTDATED BACKUP TAPES 
 
[41] Many corporations have vast stores of old backup tapes that have 
long outlived their usefulness.  They no longer serve any legitimate 
disaster recovery purpose and often are not accessible to the corporation 
either because the systems required to run those tapes are outdated and 
no longer in use or because the company no longer supports the software 
that created the documents contained on the tapes.  Also, a large number 
of tapes creates a substantial, and virtually unquantifiable, exposure to 
litigation costs.  As the amount of data that backup tapes store continues to 
increase, so too does the cost to review it all.  In addition, recent decisions 
have shown how little room for error producing parties enjoy, and the 
punishment in the form of sanctions and adverse inferences visited on 
those who fail to maintain exacting control over one’s ever increasing 
inventory of backup tapes.  Thus, a “save everything” approach is simply 
not a tenable long-term solution. 
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 109, at 34.  
118 Id. at 35.   
119 Id. Similarly, under the amendment to Rule 26(f), the parties’ discovery conference is 
to specifically include discussion of preservation and production of electronic 
information.  See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 110, at 7-8. The topics to 
be discussed include (a) “any issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically 
stored information, including the forms or forms in which it should be produced,” (b) 
“any issues relating to preserving discoverable information,” and (c) “any issues relating 
to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material.”  Advisory Committee 
Report, supra note 109, at 22-24. 
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[42] For these reasons, indefinite retention of backup tapes not subject to a 
hold is neither a favored business practice nor required by law.120  It is not 
too late to rationalize the way backup material is stored.  There is no 
prohibition against changing approaches to document retention, even 
during litigation, so long as the party takes a reasoned, deliberate approach 
to any deviations from established policy.121  Keep in mind, however, that 
courts see through—and will not tolerate—efforts to target specific 
material for deletion.  “In contrast, however, a document retention policy 
adopted or utilized to justify the destruction of relevant evidence is not a 
valid document retention policy.”122   
 
[43] Discarding of such old backup tapes, therefore, cannot be done 
without evaluating whether those tapes might contain information that is 
subject to an existing legal hold or regulatory requirement.123  And, under 
the new Federal Rules, litigants will not only have to disclose their backup 
tapes, but they will also have to demonstrate why they are 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at 
*3 (June 15, 1999) (“The recycling of back-up tapes is, under normal circumstances, a 
widely accepted business practice as, in the absence of a disaster which necessitates the 
use of the tapes, there is no need to keep them for an indefinite period of time.”); 
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4 
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (reasoning that “to hold that a corporation is under a duty to 
preserve all e-mail potentially relevant to any future litigation would be tantamount to 
holding that the corporation must preserve all e-mail”).    
121 See Drnek v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., No. CIV 01-242-TUC-WDB, 2004 WL 
1098919, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2004) (holding that absent any showing of destruction of 
relevant documents, implementation of a new document-retention policy during litigation 
is not a basis for sanctions).  Accord Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 
696, 704 (2005) (“Document retention’ policies which are created in part to keep certain 
information from getting into the hands of others, including the Government, are 
common in business. . . . It is, of course, not wrongful for a manager to instruct his 
employees to comply with a valid document retention policy under ordinary 
circumstances.”).   
122 Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30690, at *55 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006).  See also Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
102 F.R.D. 472, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (default entered where party deliberately destroyed 
documents to prevent discovery, holding that defendant “utterly failed to provide credible 
evidence that a [“bona fide, consistent and reasonable document retention policy”] 
existed”).   
123 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(Zubulake V) (recognizing that “reasonable steps” must be taken to identify documents 
subject to preservation obligations). 
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“inaccessible.”124  Companies who plan to approach their first Rule 26(f) 
conference under the new regime by merely identifying backup tapes, 
without providing any information about what they contain or how 
burdensome they are to process, run a significant risk that they will have 
to bear the costs incurred in restoring and searching them.   
 
[44] Accordingly, undertaking a process to understand what backup tapes 
contain, and to make reasonable and defensible decisions to part with them 
where possible, serves the twin aims of reducing costs and preparing to 
meet obligations imposed by the new Federal Rules.  The primary goal of 
such a remediation process is to reach reasonable, cost-efficient decisions 
about what to keep.  As information about the tapes is gathered and 
analyzed, one will be able to make judgments about whether a tape or tape 
set needs to be maintained, or can be safely discarded.   
 
[45] For example, armed with recent improvements in technology that 
generate indices of tape contents that identify custodian names and date-
ranges for e-mail, companies can isolate subsets of potentially relevant 
tapes without incurring the full costs of restoration. By separating the 
potentially relevant information for the litigation holds currently in place, 
and preserving only that information, companies can limit the amount of 
data to process when the next case comes along. 
 
[46] In addition, sampling and de-duping techniques help determine 
whether backup tapes contain large amounts of redundant information.  If 
a system is backed up on a nightly basis, most of the information on the 
system one day will be the same the next day.  The backup tapes for those 
two days, therefore, will be almost identical, and if it appears that no 
potentially relevant data has been changed, there would be little 
justification for keeping both backup tapes.  Redundant information need 
not be preserved, because a party has no obligation to search the same data 
twice.125  The remediation process generally entails five major steps: 
 
                                                 
124 See id. at 431, 432.  
125 See, e.g., Hussey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. Civ. A. 02-7099, 2004 WL 220845, 
*2-3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2004) (holding that it was unnecessary to search an electronic e-
mail archive when an identical paper archive has already been searched). 
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1. Conduct a “sweep” to ensure that reasonable steps have 
been taken to ensure that all backup tapes have been 
properly located and identified; 
2. Gather information about the backup tapes and existing 
litigation and regulatory holds potentially applicable to 
these tapes; 
3. Consult with executives to determine the possible business 
need for any information contained on the backup tapes; 
4. Cull the backup tape trove based on the information 
obtained, and the use of sampling techniques; and 
5. Work with an established vendor to quantify the cost and 
burden of fully processing the tapes that remain.  The 
resulting information will prepare the company for the 
battle to come over whether those tapes should be 
discoverable and, if so, who should pay to restore and 
search them. 
 
[47] Completion of all of these steps, including the proper documentation 
of the process and the decisions taken by the company, usually requires 
retention and active involvement of both experienced counsel and a 
qualified technological consultant. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
[48] In sum, the amended Federal Rules will require companies to disclose 
their backup tapes to the adversary, and classify them as accessible or 
inaccessible.  Unless the company can demonstrate why those tapes do not 
contain potentially relevant information, or are "inaccessible" because 
searching them would impose undue cost or burden, the trove of backup 
tapes will be part of discovery.  In addition, under current law, companies 
will likely have to preserve and produce information on backup tapes 
when those tapes provide the only source of information for persons 
critical to the underlying dispute and the producing party can identify 
where those key-personnel documents are stored on the backup tapes.  
Accordingly, companies need to develop and execute defensible 
methodologies for reviewing and disposing of backup tapes.  If not, those 
that opt to save everything will exponentially increase the costs to process 
that mounting data source (namely the expense for data storage and 
retrieval, restoration of backup tapes, and review of the data for privilege 
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and production), as well as the risks inherent in keeping potentially 
unhelpful documents that never needed to be maintained in the first place.   
 
[49] So, what is the solution?  The best, and arguably only, defensible way 
to get out from under the backup-tape burden is to reduce the 
accumulation of old backup tapes and keep the volume of backup tapes 
maintained by the company to the absolute minimum required for disaster 
recovery purposes.  Reducing the accumulated backup tapes by 
developing and implementing a defensible approach to discarding those 
tapes is not without some level of risk and will certainly involve 
substantial in-house resources, as well as a significant investment by the 
company for both technical and legal advice.  But the alternative—
keeping all of those old backup tapes and continuing to generate new 
backup tapes to add to the pile—will only result in even higher and ever 
increasing costs and risks to the organization.  Companies stand to reap 
enormous future cost savings by investing today to get their electronic-
discovery house in order. 
 
